STATEMENTS BY THE DELEGATION OF TURKEY
Statements made on 13 May 2010
Part I
Thank you Mr. Chairman,
First, I would like to touch upon some salient points on this agenda item for the recollection of the distinguished delegates.
As a system designed to ensure the security of coastal States through monitoring of vessels
at a long range, LRIT constitutes one of the useful and available tools in this regard pending
the realization of digital AIS globally.
Again as a relatively new system it has suffered from some teething problems and caused
some confusion as to the operation, data exchange, reception of LRIT information
transmitted by vessels depending on their location and flag. What is more, since some
polygons in the LRIT system had been defined as "internal" and "territorial waters", things
have gotten even more confusing. Use of these maritime jurisdiction related terminologies
unfortunately has given way to the association of the matter with sovereignty.
Those confusion made some forget that there is a series of imbedded caveats approved by
the IMO underscoring that the LRIT system does not entail any bearing on the legal and
political positions of the Contracting Governments with respect to maritime jurisdiction
issues. In other words, geographical information provided cannot be interpreted or
considered as supporting or prejudicing the position of the Contracting Governments in
relation to their maritime claims or sovereign rights thereof. Even though there is ample
volume of documents indicating that the issue has nothing to do with sovereignty, uploading
coordinates for territorial waters in the LRIT DDP, which is only about setting up a functional
area, has been presented as territorialization effort in non-compliance with international law.
We are strongly convinced that the efficient functioning of the LRIT as a surveillance system
should be a shared objective. From contextual point of view no country could think of going
that extra mile to strengthen its political and legal positions with regard to maritime
jurisdiction areas. As a technical tool yet serving to the enhancement of security, LRIT must
be best used to satisfy the legitimate security concerns of all coastal and flag States as well
as their maritime and security Administrations.
Unfortunately we had seen this coming. During previous IMO meetings we repeatedly
pointed out to the potential bickering that could come out due to adoption of polygon names
associated with some maritime jurisdiction areas. We wish that our proposals had been well
captured then.
If I am to be more specific, the case in point is the situation in the Aegean Sea. At the outset,
for the preliminary set up of the LRIT system and for testing purposes we uploaded the
coordinates that coincide with the outer limits of our SRR with a view to monitoring vessel
traffic in a broad area. Most of you in this room should well know that Turkey’s territorial sea
breadth is 6nm in the Aegean Sea. What is more, Turkey is a staunch supporter of even
lesser limit for territorial sea to keep more high seas open in enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas where special circumstances prevail. So anyone who does not want to exploit the issue
could easily figure out that our LRIT territorial waters polygons have nothing whatsoever to
do with our actual and applied territorial sea limits.
It is obvious that certain overlapping of LRIT polygons might be inevitable particularly
between adjacent and opposite coastal states in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas as is in the
Aegean. In such areas the only solution is cooperation and coordination between those
States. We did this with our Bulgarian colleagues back in February. And we made it quite
clear that Turkey has stand ready to do so with Greece. Most recently, we wanted to meet
with the Greek delegation at the margins of last LRIT Ad Hoc Working Group meeting, on an
unofficial basis, to mutually seek a technical arrangement that will satisfy both countries.
Our offer was not only turned down but also our Greek colleagues came up with a purpose
defeating and ambiguous paper calling up for "rejection of the Turkish polygons". We are
clueless if the paper is asking rejection of either Turkish internal waters or territorial waters
polygons or both. We are equally astounded as to whether the IMO has the authority to do
so. I must express that this sort of attitude is not behooving the current state of relations
between the two countries.
When we uploaded the coordinates for our three polygons in the LRIT DDP we made it clear
that they were for preliminary basis and for testing purposes. We have been considering a
modification in those coordinates for some time. Taking into account fundamental purpose,
security that is and rationale of the LRIT system as well as the significant volume of maritime
traffic destined to our ports and passing through the Turkish Straits with hazardous cargo
and all relevant circumstances, we have reached a conclusion that our polygons need to
cover areas greater than previous territorial waters polygon did.
Yet as one of the principle aspects of the LRIT system is the entitlement of the Contracting
Governments to sell information of the vessels under its flag we needed to take into account
the commercial aspect of the LRIT system. Therefore, we have just uploaded new
coordinates for the Turkish custom coastal polygon consisting of 13 grids that can be
selectively activated when and if need be. By doing so, we have also preferred not to upload
any territorial waters polygons for now.
But there remains a glitch. Due to the playful geographic specificities of the Aegean Sea and the
location of Greek islands within close proximity to Turkey, the uploaded territorial waters polygons
of Greece prevent us to track movements of Greek flagged vessels in the Aegean. This aberration
contradicts the bedrock principle of LRIT and legitimate security concerns of my country.
Availing of this opportunity, my delegation, in most clearest terms urge the Greek delegation
not to upload territorial waters polygons in the Aegean Sea so that we would be able to
monitor through the LRIT system the movements of the Greek flagged vessels approaching
to the Turkish ports or the Turkish Straits.
I would like to underline that present territorial waters polygons of Greece in the Aegean may
also push the utilization of the LRIT system to an economically non-viable point for Greece.
Though Turkey is vying for becoming the 15th biggest economy in the world, one of the main
considerations for our recent modifications has been to attain an economically feasible
arrangement. I assume this necessity is much more valid for Greece.
In this regard, I wish to recall the Chair’s conclusions of MSC 86 where he rightly stipulated
that the Contracting Governments have the option to not to provide geographical coordinates
for either internal waters and/or territorial waters and as a result they let all the others to
receive LRIT information transmitted by all vessels when within their internal waters and from
vessels under their flag when located within their territorial waters. We consider the Chair’s
call a sound proposition for the regions where special geographical circumstances prevail
and it could be best utilized for the smooth and efficient operation of the LRIT system in such
regions. We hope that Greece would soon act along those lines to not to upload territorial
waters polygons in the Aegean in the spirit of cooperation and goodwill. In this context,
we would also like to invite MSC Chairman and the Secretariat to address the situation and
come up with a practical solution in the Aegean Sea so that Turkey would be able to monitor
the maritime traffic, particularly the Greek flagged vessels through the LRIT.
Mr. Chairman,
As we are now in the production environment, we will be more able to efficiently evaluate in
real time how our current polygons will work and if they meet our requirements. This constant
assessment and inspection process will render it possible that we make fine tuning and
further modifications in the coordinates as well as types of polygons which we might upload
and re-activate in the future. Having said these, we would like to see soon that the LRIT
issue is handled as a technical matter as it should, not a politically motivated one.
I would very much appreciate it Mr. Chairman if my intervention would be fully reflected in the
minutes of this meeting.
Thank you.
Part II
Thank you Mr. Chairman,
I apologize for taking the floor again. Yet, the intervention made by my Greek colleague
prompted me to do so.
Unfortunately I sense that I have not been able to make myself clear.
We should not forget the fundamental objective of the LRIT system. It provides for the global
identification and tracking of vessels. As such, the coastal States do have a legitimate need
to identify, track and monitor vessels navigating within a distance to their coastline.
LRIT arrangements seem to function seamlessly for countries with coastal projection towards
oceans and high seas where there is no opposite coastal state facing their landmass.
However, neither life nor the geography is so simple. There are cases where there are more
than one coastal State in closed or semi-enclosed seas as well as where sea lanes exist
between and among states claiming to have an archipelagic status.
It is not fair and constructive to say there are confines of geographical dictates that have to
be put up with and it is only natural that the movements of the Greek flagged vessels
navigating in the Greek territorial waters polygons in the Aegean Sea are blocked in the
LRIT system. This disposition not only contradicts with the fundamental objective that I have
just repeated but also denies Turkey of monitoring through the LRIT most of the maritime
traffic in the area, particularly the Greek flagged vessels destined to the Turkish ports and the
Turkish Straits. The fact that last year 1181 Greek flagged vessels were en route to and from
the Turkish Straits underpins the difficulty we face now.
In the spirit of cooperation and transparency, Turkey has taken a practical and constructive
step. We do not want to apply reciprocity and blacken out the movements of the Turkish
flagged vessels in a rather large area by reloading territorial waters polygon in the Aegean
Sea. We, therefore, expect Greece to follow suit in not uploading territorial waters polygons
in the Aegean Sea and also await the MSC and the Secretariat to work in an expeditious
manner in addressing our requirements in the Aegean Sea.
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