INTRODUCTION: WHY HAVE WE CREATED THE ISM CODE?

Created by a strong desire to "do something" after the disaster of the ferry "HERALD of FREE ENTERPRISE"(HOFE) of Townsend Thoresen, the ISM code was originally issued as a self-management system of a voluntary nature for maritime safety within shipping Companies and aboard ships! It is true, at the trial of the accident, we found the TOWNSEND THORESEN Company "was working very poorly from a safety point of view” (lord justice SHEEN dixit) while at this time this ferry company was seen by all of us (ferry officers) … as one of the best in the world in its field ... Incredible! Designed on an existing ISO 9002 skeleton and adapted to an organization /management of safety/pollution prevention for a shipping company and its ships, the ISM code is focusing on the application of existing rules and recommendations and particularly on the preparation of the company, their ships and crews to deal with normal conditions and emergencies. Today it's true, by requiring shipowners to apply mandatory rules and taking into account the recommendations of the sector and especially those coming from experience of accidents in our industry, being at almost 30 years of adolescence, we would think that the “adult ISM philosophy” is now fully understood and applied effectively! Finally, NOT at ALL! New in the approach to maritime safety and orphan of a concomitant specific training, the mandatory ISM code is too often misunderstood and therefore poorly applied by companies, captains & seafarers while they continue to work apparently around the world and we sometimes wonder, if this imperfect functioning could ultimately be voluntary? why are we at this point? First of all, as an official text, no matter how perfect it is, always includes some mistakes or dark areas, which we try to rectify step by step, so the ISM code has unfortunately some weaknesses and fortunately some strengths but, some parts are still fizzy, could they be voluntarily fizzy?

So, to understand we're going to analyze a completely unbearable situation that could perhaps reveal a deception?

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STRONG POINTS OF THE ISM CODE

• In its preamble, the code reminds that IMO has called governments to take the necessary measures to protect the ship's Master in the proper exercise of his responsibilities for safety and protection of the marine environment on board his ship.
• ISM is an international code for organizing and managing safety of ships in a standard format with clearly stated objectives and measures to attain them..
• The Code has to ensure, at a minimum, compliance with mandatory rules and regulations and take into account, as far as possible and reasonable, other recommendations of our industry including those coming from feedback analysis.
• The Code is a norm written in general terms which allows a necessary adaptation as the safety of modern vessels evolves rapidly.
• For the first time, that accident feedback analysis is required in our industry.
• The Code is a complement to the requirements of SOLAS that company & ship being ready at all times to respond to emergencies which includes all those possible, depending on the type of ship and its operations of course.
• The DPA system (Designated Person Ashore) -unique in the industry- was designated to “monitor” safety in the operation of the SMS, with the help of the Master on board independently of its application by the usual executives of a shipping company who are superintendent, fleet director, technical director or other safety manager.

All anomalies, concerning safety or environmental protection must be communicated to the DPA which has a direct link with the highest level, are in theory communicated to all the management of the company... which will no longer be able to take advantage of “non-knowledge” (legally speaking) in the event of an accident resulting from these anomalies! This person, designated by top management itself, theoretically avoids possible blockages between the needs of the ship and the resources allocated by the company by informing management in a direct and safe manner. Who says “aware” for a boss ... says, legally speaking, “responsible” (voir *) Finally, all anomalies concerning safety or protection of the environment are communicated to the company top management who will no longer be able to avail themselves, in front of the court, of a "non-knowledge" in the event of an accident

In addition to the traditional inspections, an internal ISM audit process allows independent persons to detect and analyse malfunctions in an area or in the SMS itself (including therefore the monitoring carried out by the DPA) and to find solutions with operators to avoid accidents … this is a kind of double check in the pro-active side of the ISM code

• For the first time on merchant ships, the criticality of an engine must be studied in order to be able to increase its reliability and, as a corollary, the operation of the ship in degraded mode is prepared upstream i.e. first step towards the "safe return to the port system”! In addition, regular tests of stand-by devices are also required (FFS & LSA devices) to be sure of their correct operation, the day we need them.
• Self-management of safety in the company, is organized with periodic analyses of efficiency and improvement which are then communicated to the personnel involved rather than waiting for the controls of the Flag Administration.
• The code requires a clear definition of the responsibilities of all personnel involved in the safety of the ship its operations and the resulting environmental protection from the top to the bottom of the company.
• The Code is focusing on the Master's responsibility and his special power to decide in matter for safety or security.
• The standardization of management of safety in a form of mandatory system allows a "comprehensive" analysis for our industry, which is international, by definition.

THE WEAK POINTS OF THE CODE AND ITS APPLICATION.

After 30 years of existence, today we know well the weaknesses of the ISM code whatever in its design or in its application:

• The protection of the ship's master provided for in the preamble was only a rather timid "invitation" and was therefore almost everywhere completely forgotten, whether voluntarily or not!
• In many paragraphs of the code, from §5 to §12 exactly, all articles start with "the company should" and only Chapter IX of the SOLAS turns this conditional into obligation … that’s still a dark point for some people!
• ISM Compliance certification is possible by ROs (Recognized Organizations) instead of "Flag Administrations", business for them certainly, without too much “trouble” for the shipowner of course ... who is still a customer!
• There is no willingness from the ROs to see the companies putting in place an effective internal audit system that would take away any usefulness from the RO and some "power" from the Flag Administration!
• We use more and more heterogeneous crews than ever, for cost reasons first, so significant difficulties to apply a company "safety culture" appear (M/S COSTA CONCORDIA Syndrome)
• Procedures are always unknown by crew members! at every accident there is always a lack of knowledge of the procedures, which is not explained, except to suspect officers to "keep them to themselves" and to leave the Filipino or Indonesian "rating" away (M/T BOW MARINER Syndrome)
• The "reporting" required by chapter 9 of the code is never encouraged in company' SMS, perhaps to reduce paperwork … Except in the offshore and oil industry, however ... with sometimes a rather strange obligation of a minimum number of "near-misses" per month? Or may be there is another reason more subtle? (see later ...)
• The ISM training still does not really exist... rare for the DPA, absent for internal auditors and crew members, weak in training schools and almost absent elsewhere, even at the Master’s level. What's the reason? The cost may be! (LOW-COST Syndrome)
• A SMS can lead to false confidence because the shipowner thinks he is getting away with issuing a large number of technical manuals to help the crew to apply the procedures... except that the crew never reads them and therefore doesn't apply them! ... so, we often still work as before!
• Continuous training, essential for the maintenance of knowledge, is generally poorly organized and it was even necessary to wait for 2017 to realize the revalidation of the essential knowledge of the sailor ... all knowledge, except those on the ISM of course! This is finally a major non-conformity with the SOLAS convention!
• The company's and crew's preparation for responding to any emergency have remained at a basic SOLAS level which appears at each accident as the major cause of crew members or passengers’ casualties. Indeed on board, due to rehearsals, you can perform a minimum of safety exercises in a “soft manner” as on a simulator (we often simulate simple operations like cutting the arrival of fuel to MPs for example instead of really doing it) and then only ... we let you work your imagination to simulate an extension of the incident! ... so dubious on the effectiveness of drills and exercises which are supposed to enter in the continuous training (M/V NORMAN ATLANTIC Syndrome)
• Even if, all or almost all of the ISM code chapters starts with "the Company should”, no other text clearly specifies the responsibility of the company manager contrary to the Master! During the trial of the COSTA CONCORDIA accident (2014) the application of the ISM code was only "touched" and even if the liability of the company was highlighted, only our colleague Francesco SCHETTINO goes to prison. So, still no will preventing the Master from always being the best scapegoat (HOFE Syndrome)
• Internal audits which are the “fuel” of a SMS, are always "sloppy" by companies because, as external auditors use to consult the reports, internal auditors are asked to do soft in order to avoid double punishment! This is the "not seen, not catched" syndrome which is here the opposite of the desired target!
• Not any desire to clarify the role of the DPA which for many Companies remains unclear and ... this prevents it from coming "in the legs" of the transverse directors of the various departments with this terrible possibility of shunting them and going to the big boss directly! (DPA syndrome)
• An ISM Chapter 7 "Shipboard operations" far too short seems forgetting the main operations of the ship that are the conduct of the ship's navigation in all conditions and commercial operations in port (S/S EL FARO Syndrome)
• In the Flag Administrations, attempts have been made to take the ISM certification with the seriousness it deserves, it must be acknowledged. But for reasons, mainly of ignorance of the subject, the applications of certifiers were not numerous and therefore the choices were limited resulting in poor "flag" lead auditors sometimes acting in an atmosphere of general disinterest. Other more cautious flags have let the ROs taking care of it, and thus do the happiness of these "specialists of the ISM code" but, more engineers or naval architects than sailors they are unfortunately often not competent enough for management! (RO Syndrome)
• The main error in the application of the ISM, the parallel with ISO 9000 standards, was fatal. This standard being mostly administrative, in contrast to the ISM code, which claims to play on the human factor, this parallel was the origin of SMS in the form of a "mountain of paperwork" ... which instinctively pushed the sailor back! To reinforce this very bad image, we continue to train ISM certifiers as ISO inspectors, and we have come to this glaring anomaly of wanting to ensure a safety culture of excellence through an administrative quality process which is the opposite of the operational seafarer’s culture (ISO 9000 Syndrome)
• The ISM code has failed to clarify the "fuzzy" passages of maritime safety such as the difference between the "safe manning crew" and the "muster list", on the one hand a theoretical minimum crew that has nothing to do with safety and on, the other hand, a crew always ready to respond to any emergency situation which is one of the objectives of the code. (SMC Syndrome))
• Presented to the seafarer by people with no experience at sea, as something new that would finally teach him his job, the ISM code provoked a reaction of rejection sometimes very strong among Masters and other seafarers who had indeed a great "experience at sea"! (IT WAS BETTER BEFORE Syndrome)

A FAMOUS JUDGEMENT PROVOKED REACTIONS OF INCOMPREHENSION.

For the sinking of the COSTA CONCORDIA (2012), even if the civil case is far from over, criminally judgement is over all calls have been exhausted and today our colleague Francesco SCHETTINO is alone in prison ... while "COSTA CROISIERE", the company responsible for almost everything under the ISM code continues as nothing had happened (RESPONSIBLE BUT NEVER GUILTY Syndrome)

NB Remind of sentences: Captain Francesco SCHETTINO, 16 years and 3 months in prison in ROME (REBIBBIA prison). The head of the crisis cell ashore (in this case the DPA) and the Purser/Hotel manager were sentenced to 2 years and a few months for their contribution to the mismanagement of the emergency situation while the owner CARNIVAL and the operator COSTA CROISIERE get away with a fine, negotiated for all this people (except the Master of course ) ... 1.1 million Euros, a ridiculous sum for them! When we see the failures found by the commission of inquiry, it’s surprising! Even if the application of the SMS on board is the responsibility of the Master, it is the Responsibility of the Company (the DPA is designated for this) to verify that its system is properly applied on every ship through the Ship's Captain (via his constant presence/responsibility on the premises, his continuous analyses and periodic reviews) then verified by the internal auditors and randomly by the DPA itself during its own inspections ... when he does!

The list of failures found is long for COSTA CONCORDIA and there are some similarities such as the lack of adequate training of staff while we have the STCW convention since 1978 as deeply amended in 2010!

So, everything happens as if the responsibility of the company was hidden through the use of national legislation which completely forgot to integrate them into its decrees ... for a bunch of valid reasons certainly ... and so the Master always remains the best scapegoat!

Today, and to have seen it, the courts continue to ignore the ISM code, which is one of the pillars of maritime safety ... preferring to let everything on the incapacity or human error of the Master ... alone!

We thought our lawyers were going to clarify all this! Among other things, our colleague Philip ANDERSON (more lawyer than captain) who had started well as a great connoisseur of the judicial consequences of the ISM code, shunted this aspect of things! and today he is drowned in... business... (that he received the “SAS Award” in 2017 surprised many!)

For my part, I had been called by the contracted law firm for TOTAL in the ERIKA case, in order to explain to them what the ISM code was, then, still surprised by the few cases that the "maritimist" lawyers continue to make of the responsibilities of companies in the application of the Code, I offered to provide free training to a large specialized Parisian law-firm... but guess... the answer was: no thank you, we are not interested!

A lawyer, on the other hand, encouraged me, 10 years ago, to publish a handbook on the ISM code (NB it should be done soon anyway!) because apparently the developments in French that they use were insufficient (Indeed, the book “safety regulations on board merchant ships” published in 2004 does not help much on this subject, being only a succession of paraphrases of the text of the code like other supposedly specialized French documents!

However, there are currently some weak signals of change!

TODAY SOME WEAK SIGNALS, CONSIDERATION OF THE COMPANY'S RESPONSIBILITY IN ACCIDENTS SEEMS TO BE SLOWLY EVOLVING

The ISM code is quite clear in Chapter 3.2: the company should define or establish in writing the responsibilities, powers and reciprocal relationships of all safety management personnel.
But, in the last few cases of accident, the Master was often considered to be solely responsible for the non-enforcement of the regulations or procedures of the company’s SMS.
His scapegoat role seems to be confirmed every time, but we keep some hope, because in the following studies some weak signal seems appearing.





1. Accident of the container ship EL FARO (US flag) or some consideration of the owner's liability.

Following the sinking of the EL FARO in October 2015, reports by the USCG and the National Board, while implicating the Master, reported numerous other shortcomings. NB:The VDR found thanks to very large means, was usable with a 26-hour recording.
The report accuses the ship’s captain of a poor assessment, underestimation of the seriousness of the situation, a lack of precautions to escape the dangerous sector of the hurricane, a poor assessment of the condition of the ship despite the warnings of the shipboard officers ... yet, the captain was experienced and came from several years of not-so-easy trips off the coast of Alaska!

The shipowner has also been heavily criticized for numerous failures among other things violations on working hours and rest, lack of safety training, lack of maintenance or modernization of facilities (such as this huge "flag exemption" for open lifeboats for ships built before 1986!), with a "short" stability, lack of internal procedures for cyclonic periods... all this stemming were benefit from the "Grand-Father" clause!

The ABS class and the USCG are also criticized in this report for the same reasons and particularly, the ACP program -Alternative Compliance Program- typically American, which ultimately allows ships below standards to sail under the U.S. flag... amazing! The corresponding trial is still being investigated, it will be curious to see if this time the shipowner (US) will be sentenced... for negligence, for example. We can dream! **


2. In parallel, another recent analysis
(Feb 2018)
in the former magazine “Safety At Sea” (Perhaps the best maritime magazine ever!) by the "editor-in-chief" Mrs Tania Blake entitled "Finding the blame factor : We are told that investigations into major accidents such as EL FARO and COSTA CONCORDIA highlight the responsibility of shipping companies “one of the first things that we, as human beings, do in times of disaster is look for the cause and often someone to blame. It is no different in shipping, where in cases of accidents, crews find their decisions examined as to whether they were sensible and measured or hasty and ill informed. While it is right that everyone’s actions are analyzed to discover the root causes and so lessons can be learnt and shared among the industry, crew often take the brunt of blame as they are on the front line of shipping by contrast, shipowners, the individuals, and companies with true power over wider safety practices and culture often go unpunished.” credit to former Safety at Sea magazine.

My God, we're not used to hearing that! … Maybe an evolution?

It is true, in the sharing of responsibilities related to safety of the ship and her operations, it is believed, thanks to the ISM code, that the things are clear:
• The objectives of safety culture and pollution prevention are those of the operating company ... not. those of the Master
• It is the company's responsibility to establish, implement and maintain a safety management system ... created by the company and not by the ship's captain!
• To achieve the objectives, the company must establish a policy and ensure that this policy is applied by all ... This is not the Master' safety policy!
• The responsibilities of all staff must be defined... For ships, there is no problem in the merchant navy, we know how to do on board! On the other hand, we rarely find the responsibility of all the shore personnel involved and in particular their responsibilities in the application of the SMS of the company! However, since the IMO circulars of 2007 and 2013 we now find the responsibilities of the DPA quite easily without seeing them very detailed, why?
• NB Circular MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8 is very clear on this issue. The ideal would be for each function, a text message will be inserted into the job description ... IMO circulars would then become more useful.


3. In partial conclusion, how do companies react after an accident that affects them ?

In general, companies feel that governments or IMO are not competent and that they need to find the solution themselves ... this starts from a good feeling of self-regulation except that our shipowners who hate any new regulations (which for them are only going to increase their costs) will move towards an action always the cheapest possible! Indeed, in their respective associations it is like a permanent contest: who will find the cheapest solution (LOW-COST syndrome).
Finally, the existing system that give all responsibilities on the Master’s shoulders is satisfactory for them ... So why changing?

However, if at the international level and at IMO, the responsibilities of both ashore as well as on board were well defined and understood, we might not be there! ... the code was born for this partly: to define the responsibilities of each in order to assist the bodies involved in national judgments following maritime accidents. Or... if the code actually "involved" the big boss in the event of an accident! we understand better that these same big bosses are standing on the brakes for the application of the ISM code and also that they tend to interpret it to their advantage only.

ONE OF THE CAUSE OF THIS DISILLUSION IN THE ISM CODE: THE BAR HAS BEEN SET TOO LOW.

Even William O'NEIL Honorary Secretary General of IMO (he died in 2020), having a high opinion of the code
... the ISM Code in my opinion, is one of the most important steps forward that IMO has taken in maritime safety since its beginning, not because it replaces this status of all other IMO conventions, but because it embraces their standards and provides the framework by which they can be implemented!

First of all, being at the origin a voluntary policy, we remained in the official text of the ISM code to a strange conditional: The Company “should” Then, to ensure the widest possible applicability, we deliberately remained very brief in the text, sometimes doing exaggerated brevity ... such as chapter 4 where the "designated person" is missing, for example.
But to make concise, we can also make too blurry and this, sometimes allows to change the top management by trying absolutely to avoid an additional cost... always the "low-cost" syndrome that endures and which has sometimes provoked some strange application of requirements.
(See article Maritime Low-Cost generation in our AI No.118 or on the site AFCAN.org in the free forum folder)).



1. Thus, approximations continue ...
Recently, a colleague, working in a small P and I, has released us again a big enormity: I quote his analysis ... "DPA (is)responsible for every ship's safe operation" … which doesn't make sense for a person who, by definition, stays ashore.
I immediately emailed very politely in the Anglo-Saxon way, to the colleague who had kindly published his email at the end of his article... obviously I'm still today waiting for the answer (an Anglo-Saxon way again).
Recently, the 2020 SAFETY4SEA symposium in LONDON saw another fellow Captain demolishing the actual code. As a great supporter of the code at its beginnings, he has moved on to the other side today, it seems, by seeing an erratic implementation and with a certification nevertheless compliant carried out by the auditors of the ROs who finally have no idea of the management of a ship.
He also sees, as I am, with desolation, the Ship Captains falling completely under the harassment of "little leaders ashore" who therefore spend their time writing unnecessary reports instead of working to improve the "true safety culture" of their crews.
Why such approximations that can become nonsense! A lack of training again?
William O'NEAL reminded us in 2002 when we were starting to work on the text of the ISPS code: "For the writing of the ISPS code don't forget this time, contrary to the ISM code, to include the necessary training for all stakeholders" ... I know, I was there!

So, despite our efforts during the birth of the Code and then, when it was applied, it seems that it is still too ignored ... snubbed like a disillusion!


2. Is the lack of initial training would be the root cause of this disillution?
In the training centers they propose sometimes an inhouse training as the corresponding IMO model course does not exist.
Well, but it's amazing! IMO has accustomed us in the STCW code to put everything in the shape of a table including knowledge, understanding, proficiency to be acquired as a result (KUP) for all the subjects of our trade except for the ISM code which is drowned in general training? Amazing isn't it ?
• The ICS “Guidelines for the application of the ISM Code” was the first and the last valid information document on the application of the ISM code (4th edition today). These instructions, intelligently, state that "the task of implementing and maintaining SMS is a line management responsibility (while) monitoring activities must be carried out by a person independent of the responsibility for implementation" (page 16 of the 1996 edition)
• Philippe Anderson, courageously, it must be said, studied the code well from the beginning by publishing his books! Remember, his analysis in "cracking the code" published in 2003, he noted: "The full meaning of the role of the designated persona shore is still far from clear... there is still much speculation about the role and legal exposure of the DP among lawyers and academics, but to the extent that the author is aware, there have been no court decisions providing clarification on the area of doubt. The author is also not aware of possible lawsuits against a DPA by the (British) Courts!"»!
  NB He, too, has unfortunately completely forgotten the training part!
• In most of the syllabus of the ISM courses I've studied, not many of them have really understood the role of DPA, even if some made a great effort thanks to the support of the IMO circular of 2007 ("Guidelines on qualifications, training and experience of the DPA") and the other in 2013 for its responsibilities. They are clearly expressing "check and monitor aspects of the operation of each vessel, related to safety and pollution prevention" or the designated person "must ensure the effective enforcement of the safety management system.". It is therefore a job of verification and monitoring for an existing management system and not application or implementation of the system itself that belongs to the management and its directors involved.

ALL OF THIS SMELLS A SCAM, DOESN'T IT ?

The ISM code is already more than 30 years old, and it is already remembered more that quality assurance of safety management is based on a structure of verification and monitoring even if Lord Justice SHEEN had deemed "it necessary the presence of a sailor in the organization ashore" thing which was already in use anywhere in the world, except in the TOWNSEND THORESEN Company at that time apparently. We often see this terrible misunderstanding, which is to confuse the enforcement officer and the verification officer, who must be necessarily independent of the operational sector of the first. It's still quite amazing, we invent the designated person with a major original function and then we forget it to maybe allow all companies to work. Do you know many companies that have been removed from the DOC for non-compliance on the DPA?

Shipowners, lawyers, fleet-manager all same fight! in the framework of a slight paranoia you could say that it a conspiracy, a conspiracy but to protect who? Indeed, it is;
On the one hand, we follow the proponents of a DPA completely responsible for safety which lead towards new disasters because nothing can avoid the laxity of the manager in charge (as at TT line) when modern management standards require a monitoring close to control for quality insurance, in addition of the control of production (equipment or services) itself.
And on the other hand, while the arrival of artificial intelligence (AI) pushes us to review the basics and content of the seafarers of the future basic training, it would be good to admit our original mistake which was not to include a specific ISM training in STCW and finally include it with a special section in the STCW code with model courses, certification, ie.
So, the STCW code needs a review by introducing specific training to the ISM code... this shouldn't be too hard finally ...but that does not mean that all IMO members will sign easily, far from it.

SO, THE ISM CODE, SCAM or NOT a SCAM ?

Let's recap, at every major accident, the ISM code is almost forgotten: Company's top executives still get away almost free of charge The company itself sometimes disappears (TT) but reborn under another name in virtually the same state (P & O) The Master himself, never gets away without damage even when he has nothing to complain about (Capt BARDARI, MATHUR, and MANGOURAS) The Ship's Captain always looks like a scapegoat, which is right for a lot of people finally! The flag Authorities always get away without trouble (ERIKA, CONCORDIA)! The class, to which the flag delegates more and more, also always gets away without too much trouble,because we need it so much? The SMS of the company derived from the ISM code ensures in theory and at a minimum a complete compliance with the mandatory rules and regulations, why then do we still need periodic visits from the flag and these tremendous Port State Controls, ISM certification should be sufficient! You will understand that the sailors, wonder if we don't care a little about them at the end!

• Despite a lot of rather blurry passages in the ISM code, we detail only the accompanying circulars, which some flags ostensibly ignore.
• How, for a code considered a "pillar of maritime safety," we do not have an associated STCW training certificate? That we have on the other hand for the ISPS including for all crew members when the security of the ship is only part of the safety.
• We persist in using the term company "should" therefore without obligation despite the code entered in the SOLAS as Chapter IX and this is often used by some shipowners to avoid some requirement.

1. Indeed
ISM training is still a random field, while code is considered one of the best initiatives in our industry since SOLAS. It's as it was more than 30 years after the analysis of the first impacts of the code, we are still wondering how to rectify the fatal error of the beginning.
That we have forgotten the training, we admit it implicitly but as we never recognize our mistakes at IMO, it's hard to rectify.

As for the application of the ISM code, despite the efforts of IMO especially in the training of certifiers, we always find strange weak SMS, but always certified compliant and operational of course, we're not going to demolish a shipowner for that.

It may still be over the time of copied/poorly copied manuals that we found in the 2000s but if compliance has evolved, quality is far from the top level always mainly because of a lack of adequate training of all operators, from the CEO to the seafarers through the Master himself. partie de la sécurité.


2. Serious mitigation anyway.
Comme toujours il ne faut pas généraliser, certains acteurs de la gestion de la sécurité s'en tirent très bien et en général, ce sont eux qui font le moins de bruit. Beaucoup plus près de l'esprit des pionniers de l'ISM (autogestion), certaines compagnies ont mis en place des SMS d'une grande simplicité et d'une grande efficacité concomitante pour la plus grande réussite d'une culture sécurité acquise et conservée dans leur activité. Ce sont souvent des niches maritimes où les dirigeants ont les pieds sur terre.
Bizarrement ces compagnies ne sont pas valorisées y compris au niveau international, peut-être parce qu'elles ne font pas comme tout le monde et que peut-être, leur pavillon n'a aucune envie de communiquer au sein de l'OMI non plus.


3. What could we do?
Supporter of the ISM code for a long time, I do not give over, but I think we could look at an improvement in the text of the code, which could thus enlighten those who do not want to see and gain in understanding. Such a proposal will require a complete review of the text of the code itself, taking into account, the associated circulars already published but completed, if necessary.

NB This will be the occasion of another article like… Plea for a new ISM code, for example.
Reminder: such a proposal to revise the code can only go through a member country, so we will have to go through a flag delegation to the IMO.
Another challenge indeed.

CONCLUSION

Si le titre de cet article était volontairement accrocheur dans ces termes de « duperie maritime du siècle », le contenu a dû rassurer : le bilan n'est pas si mauvais que cela.
Avec les améliorations proposées ci-dessus on devrait être beaucoup plus confiants dans l'avenir.
If the title of this article was deliberately catchy in its terms "maritime scam of the century", the content must have reassured you: the balance sheet is not so catastrophic. With the improvements proposed above, we should be much more confident about the future.

But how the feedback gain is very long in our industry, examples are numerous and after 30 years how long we still have to wait for a complete review of the ISM code?

In fact, among those who devote their time for improving maritime safety and who have focused on the ISM code, the most successful users are captains or former captains with solid experience at sea, crew management and aboard safety organization experience.

All are unanimous in confirming that the centerpiece of the actual application of the code is the ship's captain and they base their action on it. But the Master, in case of accident, is the man who will pay the bill at the end!

All happens as if, treated over the shoulder by shipowners or other officials, the harmful consequences of a poor implementation of the ISM code are attributed to the Master only.

Maybe, it's for that shipowners don't want to hear about any ISM code review or either the Master's protection?
The courts and so-called maritime lawyers continue to superbly ignore the code and focus on human error or more accurately on the Ship Captain's underperformance.

In France, the Ship Masters' Association was created as a result of the French law act of 1975 on the "total responsibility" of the Master in case of accident.

It is true that in popular imagery of a ship's Master: sometimes a great navigator or a great sailor is often poorly considered (Our colleague F. SCHETTINO was also demolished for his private life).
After having been a pirate or mercenary then trafficker in "ebony", drugs or migrants, he nevertheless remained "a kind of adventurer" who today, the icing on the cake, is a big polluter.

With such a CV, obviously at trial, our conviction is assured!

(*) Important legal element that all bosses know well.
This aspect of lability of the Company' CEO has been underpinned years ago by Phil ANDERSON in his book "ISM code practical guide to the legal and insurance implications" in the chapter "self -incriminating evidence" page 191.
Much more, at the HOFE trial the president of the court is said to have said to the President of P&O: I cannot put you in jail, because the law does not exist! but I regret it.
(**) The EL FARO case came back this spring 2020 with a kind of "Mea culpa" from the USCG. Interesting, isn't it? so, we'll talk about it again.
(***)The magazine has disappeared since that time.